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BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS: COMMITTEE ON BANKING
REGULATIONS AND SUPERVISORY PRACTICES' CONSULTATIVE PAPER ON
INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT
AND CAPITAL STANDARDS*
[July 1988]
+Cite as 30 I.L.M. 967 (1991)+
Introductory Noteby
Cynthia C. Lichtenstein
In December, 1987, what was then named officially the
Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices of
the G-10 group of central bank representatives2- of ten major
industrialized countries and Switzerland (with the Bank for
International Settlements providing the Secretariat) released its
Consultative Paper on Proposals for International Convergence of
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, published in 27 I.L.M.
527 (1988) with an Introductory Note at 524 by Cynthia C.
Lichtenstein discussing the background to and predecessors of the
Proposals. The Basle Committee asked its members to gather
within six months the comments of their respective national
institutions to be affected by national implementation of the
proposals and report back to the group. Despite considerable
adverse comments from the affected banks for whom the agreed upon
minimum standard ratio of capital to risk-weighted on and off-
balance-sheet assets (8%) would be costly, the G-10 supervisors
stuck to their guns. In July, 1988, a final version of the
proposals was released, under the title of Consultative Paper on
International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital
Standards. Since it was and is the intention of the national
authorities meeting in Basle to utilize this document, in
accordance with its highly detailed terms, as a fixed basis for
promulgating national law or regulation (the Paper indicates in a
number of places just where there is room for national
discretion), and since the "Paper" has been formally endorsed by
the G-10 central bank governors,3, these mutually agreed upon
minimum standards of capital adequacy for banks doing an
international business (as defined in the Paper) are always
referred to (in the U.S. literature) as the "Basle Accord."
The Accord has been extensively described and commented
on in the literature,4" but more importantly, it has been
implemented into national law and/or regulation by not only the
*[Reproduced from the text provided to International Legal
Materials by the Bank for International Settlements. The Intro-
ductory Note was prepared for I.L.M. by Cynthia C. Lichtenstein,
Professor, Boston College Law School and Consultant, Milbank,
Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, New York.
[Proposals by the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision for the
inclusion of general provisions/general loan-loss reserves in
capital appear in a Consultative Paper at 30 I.L.M. 1009 (1991).
The Report on capital adequacy for securities firms, by the
Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities
Commissions, appears at 30 I.L.M. 1018 (1991).]
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eleven countries whose representatives participated in
negotiating the standards, but by almost all countries with banks
engaged in international business.5 " In the United States,
where there are three federal supervisors for commercial banks,
depending on the scheme of regulation the particular bank falls
into, the risk-based capital adequacy guidelines (as the
implementation of the Basle Accord in the U.S. is called) were
published, for the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (the regulator for state member banks and bank holding
companies) on January 27, 1989, 54 Fed. Reg. 4186, codified to 12
C.F.R. §208 for state member banks and 12 C.F.R. §225 for bank
holding companies, 6. for the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, supervisor of national banks, 54 Fed. Reg. 4168,
codified to 12 C.F°R. §3 and for the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, supervisor of non-member state banks, 54 Fed Reg.
1500, codified to 12 C.F.R. 325. .
The universality of the imposition on international
banks by national regulators of the Basle risk-based capital
adequacy rules was greatly aided by the promulgation by the
European Community of its minimum capital adequacy standards for
credit institutions (as entities having charters granting them
the right to take demand deposits are called in Europe). The
Community, as part of the so-called "1992" creation of a single
market, has had to enact basic minimum standards of regulation
which all Member States are required to enact into national law
in order to allow their institutions to benefit from mutual
recognition by the other Member States.8° The Community,
through the Contact Group of the EC national bank supervisors and
its own Banking Advisory Committee, keeps in close touch with the
Basle Committee,9. and in considering the Commission's proposals
for capital adequacy rules for EC credit institutions, the
European Parliament suggested the greatest possible harmonization
with the Basle Accord. Since sevenl°. of the twelve EC Member
States are members of the G-10, the EC Directives have turned the
"soft law"" obligation of the Basle Accord (applicable to
those seven) to enact national regulation according to the Accord
into the positive obligation of the Rome Treaty (applicable to
all Member States) to adopt the necessary national measures to
comply with the Directives.12.
When issued, the Basle Accord did not resolve the
thorny question13. of just what "reserves" or "provisions" set
aside by banking institutions as a deduction from their balance
sheet recordations of their lending could be counted as an item
making up required capital, but instead put a separate limit on
the inclusion of such items under national regulatory schemes
until the Basle Committee could subsequently "clarify the
distinction made in member countries between those elements which
should conceptually be regarded as part of capital and those
which should not qualify." See paragraphs 18-21 of the Basle
Accord. The Basle Committee on February 21, 1991 released the
result of its work since 1988 on this issue in the form of the
reprinted "Consultative paper on Proposals for the inclusion of
general provisions/general loan-loss reserves in capital,"
together with the proposed replacement for paragraphs 18-21 of
the Accord. The Paper is currently circulating14. among the
Supervisors of the G-10 for review and consultation and the
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Committee anticipates that the final agreed-upon language will be
incorporated into the Basle Accord before the end of the
year. The BIS' Press Release accompanying the Paper (Press
Statement by the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision) states
in its para. 3 that "[Ilt is intended that the proposals, once
finalized, be fully implemented as soon as possible, and at the
latest by the end of 1993; meanwhile the existing arrangements
described in the 1988 paper will continue to apply." So far as
the U.S. authorities are concerned, their joint statement
announcing the release of the Paper states: "The U.S. banking
agencies regard the proposals as useful and consistent with the
risk-based capital guidelines previously adopted by the U.S.
agencies in 1989. The enclosed Paper is being circulated in the
United States for information."1
6
.
Although the process has not usually resulted in
documents such as the "Proposals for the inclusion of general
loan-loss reserves in the definition of capital", 17. easily
reprintable in I.L.M., it should be recognized that the process
of holding the line on Basle harmonized risk-based capital
adequacy requirements is an on-going one. Any system of
harmonization that relies upon national implementation of
internationally agreed upon standards needs a process for
insuring that, over time and under the pressure of market forces
and the understandable desire of national regulators to give
"their" institutions a competitive edge, national implementation
does not deviate substantially from the norm. As drafted, the
Accord provides specifically for instances where there is agreed
upon national discretion, and national authorities are
specifically authorized to impose higher standards on their own
banks, but there is no formal mechanism for challenging
deviation. In the European Community, the Commission
specifically has standing to evaluate and challenge national
deviation from the Commission's interpretation of what is meant
by Directive mandates, and the European Court of Justice
ultimately must resolve any disputes.
The Basle Supervisors' Committee has no such legally
recognized mechanisms; the meetings at Basle of the G-10 finance
ministers or their central bank governors are held because they
are held: everyone comes together because they choose to do so
and not because they have imposed upon themselves a treaty
obligation to coordinate banking supervision or policy.
Nevertheless, the purpose of the convergence exercise of the
Basle Accord is not only to increase the soundness of the system,
but also to insure that there should not be a "competition in
laxity" among regulators.18. If the Basle supervisors did not
have any way for calling one another to account for yielding to
industry pressure, the exercise would lose much of its point.'9"
What appears to happen is that the Committee meets regularly in
Basle and in addition to working on capital adequacy issues not
covered in the Accord,2 " such as interest rate risk and, as
described below, securities business position risk, the group
seems to review national interpretations of the rules in the
Accord and to attempt to reach a consensus on the jurisprudence
of the rules.2 " One imagines that considerable peer pressure
is applied to any regulator refusing to go along with the
consensus.
22
.
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The story, however, of international convergence of
capital adequacy requirements is hardly finished with discussion
of the Basle Accord. As noted (n.20), the Basle Accord addresses
only credit risk.23  Yet, outside the territorial jurisdiction
of Japan and the United States, commercial banks (and, indeed,
Japanese and U.S. banking organizations in their foreign
business) include both wholesale and retail securities business
in their repertoire and the largest banking organizations compete
in the global capital markets with the multinational investment
banks or "investment services firms" as they are called in the
European Community.24  Whether the dealers in the international
capital markets are organized with commercial bank charters or
are chartered as firms doing a securities business, they incur in
their underwriting and dealing business what is known as
"position risk", or "market risk", the risk that the value of
their portfolio of securities (whether on trading books or
otherwise) will be adversely affected by downward fluctuations of
the market.25  Securities firms in most jurisdictions are under
the supervision of their home country securities supervisors
(such as the United States' Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) or the United Kingdom's Securities and Investments Board
(SIB)) under a variety of national schemes of securities
regulation. Among these supervisors, a number (for instance, the
U.S., the U.K., France and Japan) have capital adequacy
requirements 26- for the broker-dealers they supervise. Note
that the securities supervisors do not supervise banks that do a
securities business,27 so the capital adequacy requirements
that have been worked out by securities supervisors for their
charges are not applied to the securities business of the banks,
the direct competitors in the international capital markets of
the securities firms.28
Whatever the outlook for convergence between the
capital rules applying to banks in the securities markets and
those applying to securities firms (see n.28), the securities
supervisors, deliberately modeling themselves on the Basle
Committee, have been working on convergence of the capital
adequacy requirements for multinational securities firms. Just
as the banking supervisors29" meet to discuss common problems,
so the securities supervisors have been gathering annually, first
in 1975 as the Inter American Conference of Securities
Commissions and Similar Organizations, and then since 1984 as
IOSCO, the International Organization of Securities Commissions
which held its XV Annual Conference in Santiago, Chile in
November, 1990. IOSCO now has 65 securities regulating bodies
comprising its membership.3 "
Like the Conference of Banking Supervisors, IOSCO did
not at first purport to be other than an information exchange and
forum for cooperation, with, because of its inter-american
origins, a particular focus on market development. However, with
the growth in cross-border securities activities, national
regulators have recognized the possibilities for regulatory
arbitrage by multinational firms with the consequent risks to the
stability of the international financial system. The market
players as well have recognized the need for harmonization in
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securities regulation to avoid the transaction costs of
compliance with various, and often conflicting, systems of
regulation. As a result, the IOSCO Executive Committee in May,
1987 created a Technical Committee, served by IOSCO's Secretariat
in Montreal, to study critical issues affecting countries with
developed securities markets.
Since July, 1987, the Technical Committee has met twice
a year, with its work achieved by a number of Working Groups that
present reports on the fruits of their labors in developing
common regulatory standards in their particular specialized
areas.31" Working Group No. 3, one of the original six created
at the first meeting of the Technical Committee in July,
1987,32. was set up to study the issues related to capital
adequacy for securities firms "from a world-wide
perspective". -
Working Group No. 3's members were originally the UK's
International Stock Exchange, a self-regulatory organization, the
French Commission des Operations de Bourse, the Japanese Ministry
of Finance, the SIB and the SEC, although in the interest of
working on the "problems of aligning the capital requirements
applicable to non-bank securities with those which are applied to
banks", the Working Group has been enlarged to include
representatives of Germany, Holland, Sweden and Switzerland, "all
countries in which banks play a significant role in the
securities markets.,3 4 " The Group's conclusions were presented
to the Technical Committee at its meeting in Montreal, Canada on
June 20-21, 1989 and the Report (reprinted here) was adopted by
the Technical Committee and presented to the 14th Annual
Conference of IOSCO in Venice, Italy in September, 1989.
The Report, according to the Working Group's Chairman,
Jeffrey Knight, contains "an analysis at the conceptual level of
the approach of the securities regulator towards setting capital
requirements".3 " Since completion of the Report, the Group has
developed the analysis of the components a firm's regulatory
capital should contain at a more detailed level. The Group's
report to the Santiago Conference in November, 1990 consisted of
four Reports (the two mentioned in n. 26, "The Base Requirement
and the Minimum Requirements for Capital" and "Definition of
Capital", October 22, 1990).36 . The next meeting thereafter of
the Technical Committee was in March, 1991 in Hong Kong, where it
was hoped that the Basle Committee and Working Group No. 3 could
work out a framework for a common approach for capital
requirements for position risk on the basis of their respective
prior work, 37- but so far as is known, no resolution of the
differences between the Basle Committee and Working Group No. 3
was reached and Group 3 would seem to have temporarily halted its
work. The Technical Committee has met in Paris, July 16-17, 1991
and when and if that meeting is reported on, we shall know
whether convergence of capital adequacy standards for
multinational securities firms may have been halted for the
moment by the difficulties of achieving convergence for competing
participants in the markets or whether the securities regulators
have achieved a consensus on capital requirements for securities
firms that can be presented to the 16th Conference of IOSCO to be
held in Washington, D.C. in September, 1991.
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NOTES
1. The Committee, established in 1975, has been variously
referred to in the literature as the Basle Committee, the
Basle Supervisors' Committee and the Cooke Committee, after
its second chairman. For its early history by a participant
in its meetings, see Dahl, Introductory Note to the Basle
Concordat, 22 I.L.M. 900 (1983) and a description of the
earlier work of the Committee in the field of capital
adequacy, Lichtenstein, Introductory Note, 25 I.L.M. 978-981
(1986). For an extensive description of the Committee's
work up through the end of 1988 (based on the author's
fortunate access to the Committee's unpublished Reports),
see Norton, Capital Adequacy Standards: A Legitimate
Regulatory Concern for Prudential Supervision of Banking
Activities?, 49 Ohio State L.J. 1299 (1989) at 1336-1348.
The Committee has now changed its name to the "Basle
Committee on Banking Supervision" and is chaired, as of
July, 1991, by E. Gerald Corrigan, President of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York.
2. See Norton, op. cit. n.l at 1301 for a list of the
institutions represented on the Basle Committee.
3. See the discussion of the Paper in Fed Staff Summary and
Recommendations on Risk-Based Capital Plan [July-Dec.]
Banking Rep (BNA) No. 6, at 232 (Aug. 8, 1988).
4. See, e.g., Norton, The Work of the Basle Supervisors
Committee on Bank Capital Adequacy and the July 1988 Report
on "International Convergence of Capital Measurement and
Capital Standards", 23 Int'l Law. 245 (1989); Cooke,
International Convergence of Capital Adequacy Measurement
and Standards, in Festschrift for Jack Revell, Institute for
European Finance, 1990; and, particularly, because the
author is Secretary of the Basle Committee and comments upon
the reasons for the particular style of the Paper, Hayward,
Prospects for International Cooperation by Bank Supervisors,
24 Int'l Law. 787 (1990).
5. Opening Session Address to the XV Annual Conference of the
International Organization of Securities Commissions,
Santiago, Chile, by H.J. Muller, Chairman of the Committee
on Banking Regulation and Supervisory Practices of the Bank
for International Settlement, November 17, 1990 at p. 4.
6. It should be noted that G-10 central banks only agreed (to
the extent that the Accord may be called an "agreement" -
how it would be characterized in international law is
uncertain - see Norton, supra n. 1, at 1347, n. 249) to
apply the harmonized standards to banks doing an
international business. The U.S. regulators, including,
under the Congressional mandate of FIRREA, the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989,
the reorganized thrift regulator, the Office of Thrift
Supervision, have chosen to apply the Basle standards, as
interpreted by the U.S. regulators and as supplemented by
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additional mandatory leverage ratios, to all commercial
banks, thrifts and bank holding companies. (For a report by
Fed on differences in capital and accounting standards among
the Federal banking and thrift agencies, see 55 Fed. Reg.
39060 et seq., Monday, Sept. 24, 1990.) What securities
issued by the holding company count as the required capital
is, however, eased in the case of the holding companies. To
date, as far as the author is aware, the U.S. is the only
jurisdiction applying the Basle standards to companies
owning banks subject to the rules, although, in a very
important case, Judgement of the Swiss Federal Supreme
Court, Second Public Law Division, llth December 1990, in
the matter of Credit Suisse, Zurich, against the Federal
Banking Commission concerning own funds requirements for
Credit Suisse, the Swiss Federal Court upheld the Swiss
Federal Banking Commission in applying the capital rules to
the parent company owning both Credit Suisse and Credit
Suisse First Boston, the securities firm.
7. For a description of the U.S. commercial bank and bank
holding company requirements, including a diagram of the
risk based capital fraction and a chart summary of the risk
weights and risk categories under the U.S. implementation,
see Puleo, Balance Sheet Restructuring/Capital Adequacy in
Puleo and Smith, Co-Chairmen, PLI Institute of Banking Law
and Regulation 1989 at 459. For the history of the U.S.
regulators' approach to risk-based capital adequacy
standards, see Lichtenstein, Recent Developments in
Prudential Controls on U.S. Banks' International Activities,
Chap. 33 in Norton, ed., SMU Institute in International
Finance, Prospects for International Lendings and
Reschedulings (Matthew Bender 1988).
8. For the background to EC legislation in the banking field,
see Lichtenstein and Sands, "Europe and Banking 1992",
Chap. V in Executive Enterprises Publications Co, Inc.,
pub., Tomorrow's Banks: Developments Shaping the 1990's
(1989). In EC legislation, the risk basked capital adequacy
rules are divided into two separate Directives, the
Directive defining what constitutes capital for the purposes
of the capital adequacy fraction or ratio, Own Funds
Directive, 89/299/EEC, OJ No L 124, 5.5. 1989 and the
Solvency Ratio Directive, 89/647/EEC, OJ No L 386,
30.12.1989. Implementing national legislation tends to
follow the structure of the Directives so that for the
twelve member states of the EC, the risk-based capital
adequacy rules are found in legislation - or regulation -
or, as in the U.K. which has its own particular system of
bank supervision, a Notice to Institutions Authorized Under
the Banking Act 1987 - providing separately for a definition
of what balance sheet items will count as capital ("Own
Funds") and the Solvency Ratio, the amount of Own Funds to
be held against each on and off-balance sheet transaction
whose credit risk must be provided for under the Accord and
the EC Solvency Ratio Directive.
9. See Norton, op. cit. n. 1 at 1339.
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10. Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands and
United Kingdom.
11. See Norton, 2p. cit. n. 1 at 1347 and n. 249.
12. As an example of national implementation of the EC Solvency
Ratio Directive, see the Bank of England Banking Supervision
Division, "Implementation in the United Kingdom of the
Solvency Ratio Directive", BSD/1990/3, December 1990. The
Bank of England had previously implemented what it calls the
Basle Convergence Agreement [the Basle Accord] by
BSD/1988/3, issued in October 1988.
13. See Lichtenstein, Latin American Debt Writeoffs Could Erode
Bank Capital, Banking Law Review 60 (Summer 1988) for just
why this is a thorny question.
14. See, as an example of how the U.S. regulators now circulate
the Basle Committee proposals, Circular No. 10441, March 21,
1991 of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York addressed to
all State Member Banks, Bank Holding Companies and Branches
and Agencies of Foreign Banks in the Second Federal Reserve
District and enclosing the Basle Committee Paper. The fact
that N.Y. Fed circulates Basle papers to Branches and
Agencies of Foreign Banks in the Second Federal Reserve
District is very interesting. Branches (other than so-
called "Federal" branches, a method of entry chosen by very
few foreign banks) of foreign banks in the U.S. are not
presently required by federal law to have specially
allocated capital (although N.Y. banking law has asset
requirements), a difficult concept since a branch is part of
the foreign chartered entity which presumably is subject to
the foreign chartering jurisdiction's implementation of the
Basle Accord. The one thing that the Basle Accord says
nothing about is how host country regulators shall supervise
capital adequacy requirements with respect to foreign banks
entering the jurisdiction by branching. Traditionally Fed,
as a condition of approval of the entrance by foreign banks
present in the U.S. into nonbanking business in the U.S.
(where Fed has jurisdiction under the Bank Holding Company
Act as amended by the International Banking Act of 1978),
has attempted to ensure that the foreign institution's
capital is genuinely comparable to the capital required to
be held by its U.S. bank competitors. It is said (by Peter
Cooke in an interview with the author) that one of the
impetus' for the Basle Accord was the difficulty experienced
by the then Chairman of the Fed, Paul Volcker, in making
such capital holdings comparisons, given the then lack of a
common definition of "capital".
15. See the N.Y. Fed Circular, op. cit. n. 14.
16. Id. Scholars interested in international legal process and
the question of whether national authorities will, in fact,
carry out such a harmonized "agreement" as the Accord might
wish to examine both the Paper and the U.S. 1989 guidelines
to see if in fact the U.S. authorities have excluded from
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their measure of capital those provisions which the
Committee now says are to be excluded.
17. The proposed amending language of the Accord attached to the
Proposals is a distinct innovation, albeit one that was
agreed on upon in the Accord itself; this is the first
instance of a proposed amendment to the Accord itself.
18. See the Introductory Note at 27 I.L.M. 524 (1985) for a
fuller explication of this idea.
19. Hayward, op. cit. n. 4, makes this point very well.
20. As is evident from the text of the Accord, the harmonized
standards cover only credit risk and do not address, for
instance, the interest rate risk inherent in a bank's
portfolio of debt securities. The U.S.'s thrift regulator,
the Office of Thrift Supervision, is plunging ahead in this
area and its work may presage international convergence in
this risk area as well. For a critique of the OTS'
initiative, see Peet and Lustgarten, "Banks' Future Evident
in Capital Rules for S&Ls", Am. Banker, Tuesday, March 26,
1991. See also n.23, below.
21. The assumption as to process is made from a Fed release, SR
90-23 (FIS), dated July 3, 1990, addressed to the Officer in
charge of supervision at each Federal Reserve Bank, and
enclosing a "Federal Reserve Staff Memorandum on Questions
and Interpretations Relating to the Implementation of the
Risk-Based Capital Framework." The Associate Director of
Supervision's letter states: "Over the last several months,
the Federal Reserve Staff has participated in discussions
among countries that have adopted the Basle risk-based
capital framework. The purpose of these ongoing discussions
is to review questions relating to the implementation of the
Accord and to facilitate a broadly consistent approach to
implementation of the framework internationally." The
letter goes on to say about the enclosed memorandum: "The
memorandum also describes the consensus that has been
reached by supervisors from the G-10 countries on these
issues. The guidance contained in the memorandum is
intended to clarify how the Accord is to be implemented; it
does not amend the framework or alter its basic structure."
22. See the story from the Financial Times of June 1, 1989,
p. 2, reprinted as Document 2 to Puleo, op. cit. n. 7,
stating that the Bank of England had "closed the door" on a
certain type of floating rate note issues counting as
capital under the rules "after consultations with bank
regulators from other countries" even though the Bank had
already approved such an issue for the Royal Bank of
Scotland.
23. However, the regulators meeting at Basle have been fully
aware of the limited coverage of the Basle Accord; indeed,
national discretion is given in risk-weighting of OECD
country government securities to increase the risk weighting
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from 0 to 10% as a rough surrogate for the interest rate
risk on bank portfolios of the instruments. Moreover, the
closure in the first week of July of the multinational
banking firm of Bank of Credit and Commerce International's
bank subsidiaries in a number of countries for fraud,
allegedly undertaken to cover up huge speculative losses in
its governments portfolio, has given the Basle group an
impetus to refine its rules to include the risk of loss from
market risks in foreign exchange and debt and equity
securities. See "Collapse Lends Urgency To Push for Bank
Rules", New York Times, July 9, 1991, pp. Dl and D6, cols. 6
and 1-2.
24. "In the world's major [financial] centres there are legal
barriers separating banking and securities business now only
in the United States and Japan." MUller, op. cit. n. 5.
25. This is not to say that holders of securities do not incur
credit risk as well, that is, the risk that the issuer of
the securities, if debt, will not pay or, if equity, will
fail or be reorganized so as to wipe out the equity.
26. For a comparison of the four countries' securities
regulators' equity and debt position risk requirements, see
two of the four reports prepared by IOSCO's [explained in
the text at n. 30] Technical Committee's Working Group
No. 3, "Comparison of Equity Position Risk Requirements and
Scope for Harmonization," June, 1990, and "Comparison of
Position Risk Requirements for Debt Securities", June, 1990,
included as part of the Report of the Technical Committee of
IOSCO on Capital Requirements for Multinational Securities
Firms presented to the XV Annual Conference of the
International Organization of Securities Commissions
(IOSCO), Santiago, Chile, November 13, 1990, and available
from the Secretariat of IOSCO, C.P. 171, 800 Square
Victoria, Suite 4510, Montreal, Quebec H4Z 1C8 Canada.
27. For preliminary discussion (as of 1988) of how the
jurisdictional problem has been worked out in the United
Kingdom between the Bank of England and the SIB, as well as
background to the work of IOSCO's Technical Committee in the
field of capital adequacy, see Lichtenstein, Remarks, in the
Panel on The Internationalization of the Securities Markets,
Proceedings of the 82d Annual Meeting of the American
Society of International Law (1988), pp. 305-309.
28. For a description by a Federal Reserve Bank economist of the
differences in approach to capital adequacy requirements for
securities firms and commercial banks, see Haberman,
"Capital Requirements of Commercial and Investment Banks:
Contrasts in Regulation", Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Quarterly Review, Autumn, 1987, pp. 1-10. However, Haberman
wrote his piece (emphasizing "contrasts") on the basis of
the very separate development of U.S. regulation of broker-
dealers under U.S. securities laws and U.S. commercial bank
regulation under U.S. banking laws without any experience of
regulation of the securities business of banks. Since 1987,
both the international bank regulators and the international
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organization of securities regulators have concerned
themselves with the possibilities for harmonization of
capital requirements so as to insure that both sets of
competitors in the national and international capital
markets have a joint "level playing field" on which to play.
Thus H.J. MUller, the third Chairman of the Basle Committee,
stated in his Opening Session Address to the XV Annual
Meeting of IOSCO, cited above n. 5: "We (the Basle
Committee] are now working on the treatment of market risks,
which include the risks on positions held by banks in debt
and equity securities. If we are to reach agreement on a
set of minimum standards for this work, it is clear to the
Basle Committee that such agreement will need to involve
some forms of understanding with the regulators of competing
non-bank firm [sic]." See also the Remarks by Jeffrey
Knight, Chairman, Working Party No. 3, introducing the
Report of the Technical Committee of IOSCO on Capital
Requirements for Multinational Securities Firms, supra
n. 26, at pp. 6-7. However, the understanding among the
different types of regulators may be hard to reach. The
difficulties of reconciling the approach of the securities
regulators to their charges and how the banking regulators
treat the securities trading books of so-called "universal"
banks has apparently delayed the promulgation by the EC of
its proposed Capital Adequacy Directive, the analogue for
the EC's Investment Services Directive, Proposal for a
Council Directive on investment services in the securities
field, Com (88) 778, O.J. 22.2.89 C 43/7, of the Solvency
Ratio Directive for the Second Banking Directive. See
Waters, "The quest for a capital adequacy directive",
Financial Times, April 5, 1991, p. 21. See also Parlour,
Capital Adequacy Developments Internationally and in the
European Community: A Tale of Two Systems, [1990] 6 JIBL.
29. In September, 1990, the sixth International Conference of
Banking Supervisors was hosted in Frankfurt by the German
supervisory authorities and over one hundred countries were
represented. MUller, op. cit. n. 5 at 2.
30. The 16th Conference will be hosted by the U.S.' Securities
and Exchange Commission and will be held in Washington, D.C.
in September, 1991.
31. At the IOSCO Santiago meeting, the Technical Committee was
reorganized into four core working groups (regulation of
secondary markets; regulation of market intermediaries,
including capital adequacy; enforcement and exchange of
information; multilateral disclosure and accounting
standards) that are expected to report at the next meeting
of the Technical Committee July 16-17 in Paris. See 4 Int'l
Sec. Reg. Rep. No. 8, p. 3 (March 25, 1991).
32. See Lichtenstein, op. cit. n. 27.
33. Capital Adequacy Standards for Securities Firms, August 10,
1989, p. 1.
